

Date of Hearing: July 15, 2025
Chief Counsel: Andrew Ironside

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Nick Schultz, Chair

SB 571 (Archuleta) – As Amended May 23, 2025

UPDATED**As Proposed to be Amended in Committee**

SUMMARY: Provides for increased penalties for impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order and provides that the fact that a person convicted of looting committed the offense while impersonating emergency personnel is a factor in aggravation at sentencing. Specifically, **this bill:**

- 1) Provides that any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order as defined, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished either by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed \$2,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine, or by imprisonment for 16 months, two years or three years and by a fine not to exceed \$20,000.
- 2) Provides that “first responder” means a first responder as defined under Section 8562 of the Government Code, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under Section 313 of Subchapter V of Chapter 1 of Title 6 of the United States Code.
- 3) Provides that, in sentencing a person convicted of looting, the court may consider the fact, if plead and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation in sentencing.
- 4) Defines “emergency personnel” as a peace officer, an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, an employee of a public utility or district, state, county, city, or special district, a city and county officer or employee, an officer or member of a governmental agency-managed or -affiliated search and rescue unit or team, an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States, the California National Guard, the State Guard, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
- 5) Defines “impersonating” as the willful wearing, exhibiting, or using of an authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of emergency personnel

with the intent of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are a member of emergency personnel.

- 6) Provides that, for the purposes of applying the aggravating factors for aggravated arson, it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.

EXISTING LAW:

- 1) Provides that a person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if:
 - a) The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years;
 - b) The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of \$10,100,000, exclusive of damage to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings; or,
 - c) The fire cause damage to, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited dwellings. (Pen Code, § 451.5, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
- 2) Provides a sunset date for the aggravated arson statute of January 1, 2029.
- 3) Makes willfully wearing, exhibiting, or using the authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate card, or writing, of a peace officer, a member of the fire department, an employee of a public utility or district, a government officer or employee, or search and rescue personnel, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating them or of fraudulently inducing the belief that the defendant is one of them, a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to six months, by a fine of \$1,000, or both. (Pen. Code, §§ 538d, subd. (a); 538e, subd. (a); 538f, subd. (a); 538g, subd. (a); 538h, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 19.)
- 4) Makes willfully wearing, exhibiting, or using the badge of any of the above personnel, except that of a government employee or an employee of a public utility or district, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating them or of fraudulently inducing the belief that the defendant is one of them, a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in county jail, a fine of up to \$2,000, or both. (Pen. Code, §§ 538d, subd. (b)(1); 538e, subd. (b)(1); 538h, subd. (b)(1).)
- 5) Provides that any person who willfully wears or uses any badge that falsely purports to be authorized for the use of one who by law is given the authority of any of the above personnel, or which so resembles the authorized badge of the above personnel as would deceive any ordinary reasonable person into believing that it is authorized for the use of one who by law is given that authority, for the purpose of fraudulently impersonating them or of fraudulently

inducing a belief that they are one of them, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to one year, by a fine of \$2,000, or by both. (Pen. Code, §§ 538d, subd. (b)(2); 538e, subd. (b)(2); 538g, subd. (b)(2); 538h, subd. (b)(2).)

- 6) Provides that any person who impersonates a peace officer during the commission of a felony shall receive an additional one-year term of imprisonment to be imposed consecutive to the term imposed for the felony, in lieu of the penalty that would have been imposed for impersonating a peace officer.” (Pen. Code, § 667.17.)
- 7) Provides that any person who makes or sells a badge falsely purporting to be that of a peace officer, fire fighter, or government official as described above is subject to a fine of up to \$15,000. (Pen. Code, §§ 538d, subd. (c)(1); 538e, subd. (c); 538g, subd. (b).)
- 8) Provides that any uniform vendor who sells a uniform identifying a law enforcement agency or firefighting agency, without verifying that the purchaser is an employee of the agency, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in county jail or by a fine of up to \$1,000. (Pen. Code, §§ 538d, subd. (e)(2); 538e, subd. (e)(3).)
- 9) Provides that a person who commits a specified offense during and within an affected county in a state or local emergency, or under an evacuation order, is guilty of looting and subject to punishment as follows:
 - a) Where the underlying offense is second-degree burglary, by imprisonment up to one year in county jail or by 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (a).)
 - b) Where the underlying offense is grand theft, except grand theft of a firearm, by imprisonment in a county jail for one year or by 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (b).)
 - c) Where the underlying offense is second-degree burglary or grand theft, a mandatory minimum term of 180 days in county jail for a person who receives probation, except that a court may reduce or eliminate the jail sentence in the interest of justice. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (a) & (b).)
 - d) Where the underlying offense is petty theft, for a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for six months. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (c).)
 - e) Where the underlying offense is petty theft, a mandatory minimum term of 90 days in county jail for a person who receives probation, except that a court may reduce or eliminate the jail sentence in the interest of justice. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (c).)
- 10) Provides that, for purposes of a looting involving second-degree burglary, the fact that the structure entered has been damaged by the earthquake, fire, flood, or other natural or manmade disaster shall not, in and of itself, preclude conviction. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (a).)
- 11) Defines burglary as entering a specified structure, vessel, or vehicle with the intent of committing theft or any felony therein. (Pen. Code, § 459.)

- 12) States that burglary of an inhabited dwelling is first degree burglary, and that all other kinds of burglary are of the second degree. (Pen. Code, § 460.)
- 13) Provides that, for the purposes of burglary, “inhabited” means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not. A house, trailer, vessel designed for habitation, or portion of a building is currently being used for dwelling purposes if, at the time of the burglary, it was not occupied solely because a natural or other disaster caused the occupants to leave the premises. (Pen. Code, § 459.)
- 14) Divides theft into two degrees, petty theft and grand theft. (Pen. Code, § 486.)
- 15) Defines grand theft as when the money, labor, or real or personal property taken is of a value exceeding \$950 dollars, except as specified. (Pen. Code, § 487.)
- 16) Defines petty theft as obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed \$950 and makes it a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding \$1,000, by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or both, except as specified. (Pen. Code, § 490.)
- 17) Defines “state of emergency” as conditions that, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(1).)
- 18) Defines “local emergency” as conditions that, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(2).)
- 19) Provides that a “state of emergency” shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency until terminated, as specified, and that a “local emergency” shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency by the local governing body until terminated, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(3).)
- 20) Defines “evacuation order” as an order from the Governor, or a county sheriff, chief of police, or fire marshal, under which persons subject to the order are required to relocate outside of the geographic area covered by the order due to an imminent danger resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or manmade disaster. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(4).)

FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown.

COMMENTS:

- 1) **Author's Statement:** According to the author, “Almost immediately, after the firestorms erupted in Southern California in January 2025, there were reports of criminals attempting to take advantage of victims displaced by the fires. While Angelenos scrambled to find alternative shelter, there were reports of predatory behavior by individuals impersonating as

first responders, firefighters, and disaster relief workers, including FEMA workers, in order to scam fire victims. Additionally, many news outlets reported looting and property theft by individuals rummaging through ashes and burned buildings looking for things of value. Early reports during the emergency found 20 individuals were apprehended and faced looting charges. Looting during the emergency led the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrol and provide a quicker response time, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Governor Newsom even called for looting in fire evacuation zones to be a felony. Ensuring the public can trust first responders and local public safety officials is crucial in keeping communities safe, especially during states of emergency when victims are in disarray. Penalties for these crimes should be proportional to the egregiousness of the pain and exploitation of victims. Strengthening these penalties will protect first responders, communities, and increase trust in California's ability to respond to state of emergencies and protect victims. SB 571 will ensure California holds those who take advantage of a disaster and victims are held accountable. Strengthening penalties for looting and impersonation in evacuation zones will ensure victims feel safe and protected."

- 2) **False Impersonation:** Existing law punishes false impersonation of emergency personnel as a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, §§ 538d, 538e, 538f, 538g, & 538h.) This bill would increase the penalty for false impersonation of emergency personnel in an evacuation zone to an alternate felony-misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to one year or for 16 months, two years, or three years.

Additionally, this bill provides that, in sentencing a person convicted of looting, the court may consider the fact, if plead and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation in sentencing. Existing law states that looting is the commission of specified crimes during a state or local emergency, or in a county that is under an evacuation, and creates penalties in addition to the underlying offense for looting. (Pen. Code, § 463.) Specifically, where the underlying offense is burglary or grand theft, the punishment for looting is an alternate felony-misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to one year or by imprisonment for 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subs. (a) & (b).) Subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 1170 provides that the court may not order imposition of the upper term unless an aggravating circumstances have been plead or proven; absent this showing, the sentence may not exceed the middle term. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(2).) Thus, under this bill, a person convicted of looting found to have committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel could be found eligible for the upper term.

- 3) **Longer Sentences' Impact on Recidivism and Deterrence:** Research shows that increasing the severity of the punishment does little to deter the crime.¹ According to the National Institute of Justice, "Laws and policies designed to deter crime by focusing mainly on increasing the severity of punishment are ineffective partly because criminals know little about the sanctions for specific crimes. More severe punishments do not 'chasten' individuals convicted of crimes, and prisons may exacerbate recidivism... Studies show that for most individuals convicted of a crime, short to moderate prison sentences may be a

¹ National Institute of Justice, *Five Things about Deterrence* <<https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247350.pdf>> [accessed Mar. 26, 2025].

deterrent but longer prison terms produce only a limited deterrent effect.”² Rather, increasing the perception that an individual will be caught and prosecuted is a vastly more effective deterrent than increased punishment. Studies also show that custodial sanctions have no effect on recidivism or slightly increase it when compared with the effects of noncustodial sanctions such as probation.³

- 4) **Aggravated Arson Provision:** The aggravated arson statute, Penal Code section 451.5, became effective in 1995 through enactment of SB 1309 (Craven), Chapter 421, Statutes of 1994. The original statute contained a five-year sunset provision which stated that the purpose of the provision was to allow the Legislature to consider the effects of inflation on the property damage/losses threshold in the law. At the time of the aggravated arson offense’s implementation in 1995, the total monetary amount of property damage and other losses was set at \$5 million.

Because of this, the cost of inflation is to be considered by the Legislature within five years when extending the sunset on the statute and/or making changes to the monetary threshold. The statute’s sunset and monetary threshold has increased several times since 1995. The most recent sunset extension, SB 281 (McGuire), Chapter 706, Statutes of 2023, raised the dollar limits required to trigger the statute to account for inflation from \$8.3 million to \$10.1 million. Additionally, the bill established a sunset date of January 1, 2029 for this excessive damage factor.

This bill would add legislative intent stating that amendments to the threshold dollar amount shall apply prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed a crime or received a sentence before the effective date of the threshold.

Penal Code section 3, which was enacted in 1872, states that “No part of the Penal Code is retroactive unless expressly so declared.” So prospective application of a statute is presumed. This includes the changes made to the aggravated arson statute by SB 281.

However, a long-standing, limited exception to this rule has been recognized by the courts when ameliorative legislation (that which lessens punishment or reduces criminal liability) goes into effect. In this instance, courts generally presume the Legislature intends the benefits of the new enactment to apply as broadly as constitutionally permissible to all cases not yet final on appeal. (*In re Estrada* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745.) The California Supreme Court explained its reasoning as follows:

There is one consideration of paramount importance. It leads inevitably to the conclusion that the Legislature must have intended, and by necessary implication provided, that the amendatory statute should prevail. When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to

² Ibid.

³ D.M. Petrich, et al., *Custodial Sanctions and Reoffending: A Meta-Analytic Review* (2021).

which it constitutionally could apply. The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final. This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology. (*Id.* at pp. 744–745.)

Recently, in *People v. Burgos* (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, the Supreme Court discussed the broad application of *Estrada* rule:

We have applied *Estrada*'s inference of retroactivity to legislation that created an affirmative defense, contracted a criminal offense, or otherwise lessened punishment in some meaningful manner. These laws have included statutes addressing penalty enhancements as well as statutes concerned with substantive offenses. (E.g., *People v. Prudholme* (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 968–969 [statute reducing maximum probation term for nonviolent offenses applies retroactively]; *People v. Wright* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 95 [newly enacted affirmative defense to transporting marijuana applies retroactively]; *Nasalga, supra*, 12 Cal.4th at p. 798 (plur. opn. of Werdegarr, J.) [amendments that increase monetary amount of property loss to trigger sentencing enhancements apply retroactively]; *Tapia, supra*, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 300–301 [statute specifying that certain death-penalty qualifying special circumstances must be intentional applies retroactively]; *People v. Rossi* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 302 [amendatory statute decriminalizing the commission of certain sexual acts applies retroactively].) We have also applied the *Estrada* inference to statutes that give trial courts discretion to impose lesser punishment. (*People v. Stamps* (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 699 [statute eliminating restriction on trial court's ability to strike serious felony enhancement applies retroactively]; *People v. Francis* (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 76 (*Francis*) [modified treatment of marijuana possession from straight felony to either felony or misdemeanor applies retroactively].)

More recently, we have applied the *Estrada* inference to statutes that, while not limited to reducing punishment for a particular crime, created a concrete avenue for certain individuals charged with a criminal offense to be treated more leniently or avoid punishment altogether. (*Frahs, supra*, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 624, 629 [statute creating pretrial diversion program in lieu of criminal prosecution for individuals suffering from qualifying mental health disorders applies retroactively]; *People v. Superior Court (Lara)* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303 (*Lara*) [statute prohibiting prosecutors from directly filing criminal charges against minors in “adult” criminal court and giving juvenile courts sole discretion to decide whether to prosecute minors as adults applies retroactively].) (*People v. Burgos, supra*, 16 Cal.5th at p. 13, parallel citations omitted.)

This bill states intent that the time-honored *Estrada* rule should not apply to the changes updating the monetary thresholds in the aggravated arson statute. It is unclear whether the current Legislature can speak to the legislative intent of a bill enacted in a prior legislative

session.⁴ Regardless, this statement of intent undermines the efforts of the prior Legislature to update the monetary values to account for inflation, which is why there is a sunset date in the statute to begin with.

- 5) **Argument in Support:** According to the *California Police Chiefs Association*, “During the January 2025 fires in Southern California, we saw reports of criminals attempting to take advantage of victims who were displaced by evacuation orders. They disguised themselves as firefighters, FEMA workers, and even police officers to gain access to fire-damaged areas. They went as far as using decommissioned firetrucks to pose as firefighters including wearing firefighter turnout gear, CAL Fire t-shirts, and equipping helmets and radios.

“In addition to the impersonation of first responders, these unlawful actors engaged in looting and property theft rummaging through the ashes of victim’s homes and personal belongings. The severity of these crimes forced the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrols and provide quicker response times, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Current penalties for these abuses are not proportional to the pain, loss, and grievance of victims.

“The damage caused by impersonators and looters far exceeds the monetary losses to communities and victims’ personal property. These abusers and their actions undermine evacuation orders, local official’s authority, and victims’ peace of mind. Ensuring the public can trust first responders and local public safety officials is crucial in keeping communities safe, especially during states of emergency when victims are in disarray. SB 571 will ensure California holds those who take advantage of a disaster and victims are held accountable. Strengthening penalties for looting and impersonation in evacuation zones will ensure victims feel safe and protected.”

- 6) **Argument in Opposition:** According to the *Vera Institute of Justice*, “**SB 571 is alarmingly broad and invites abuse.** The bill’s harsher penalties make property crimes during a state or local emergency a mandatory felony across the entire jurisdiction and for six months after the emergency. For example, the recent states of emergency declared in Los Angeles and Ventura County apply to more than 10 million people over almost 6,000 square miles—many nowhere near the fire zones—and they can be renewed for months or years. The entire State of California is also under several open states of emergency (among others, for bird flu and wildfire protection). As a result, this bill would increase the penalties for property crimes statewide regardless of their connection to an actual active emergency. This is not only vastly overbroad, but it also creates a risk for abuse. For example, during the COVID-19 state of emergency, prosecutors misused looting laws to sidestep California’s bail policies, and SB 571 invites similar abuses.

“**The bill will also remove much needed judicial discretion.** We trust judges to distinguish between ordinary property crime and intentionally harming communities during emergencies. By mandating incarceration time in every case, and removing judges’ abilities to waive this requirement in the interest of justice – judges will be unable to consider someone’s mental health, background, or intent, to ensure appropriate sentencing outcomes.

⁴ Of note, there are close to 30 newly-elected Senators and Assembly Members serving in the Legislature for this first time this year that did not vote on SB 281.

“Because SB 571 applies to such broad swaths of California, it also risks worsening racial disparities in the criminal legal system. For example, Black community members in Altadena experienced racial profiling during the recent Los Angeles fires with false accusations of looting. Past experience also shows that media coverage reinforces a harmful and racialized double standard in the wake of natural disasters. SB 571 may place already vulnerable communities at even greater risk under the guise of safety.

“Instead of responding to the expressed needs of people impacted by the fires, SB 571 prioritizes a costly criminal legal response. The Essie Justice Group surveyed 137 Altadena residents impacted by the Eaton Canyon Fire and not a single person mentioned looting or theft. Instead, Altadena residents want public officials to provide timely cash assistance, reconstruction, and improved emergency preparedness. **Extensive research shows that SB 571 will not deter crime and improve public safety.** There is no evidence the Los Angeles District Attorney, for example, was unable to charge any looting offenses during the recent fires in Los Angeles as a felony. With the state spending more than \$130,000 per year to incarcerate one person, these increased penalties are unnecessary and will only divert critical funds away from disaster relief.

“All Californians deserve safe communities, especially during emergencies. SB 571, however, is overly broad and puts communities of color at risk with short-sighted and wasteful measures that fail to address the immediate needs of fire victims in Los Angeles. As we face the increased impacts of climate change, we should focus on strengthening our state’s emergency preparedness and working with communities to rebuild public trust.”

7) **Related Legislation:**

- a) AB 271 (Hoover) would make looting a straight felony and would create a two-year enhancement for any looting conviction in which the defendant impersonated a first responder, as specified. The hearing on AB 271 was canceled at the request of the author.
- b) AB 468 (Gabriel) would establish increased penalties for looting in an evacuation zone and impersonating emergency personnel in an evacuation zone. AB 468 is scheduled to be heard today in the Senate Public Safety Committee.
- c) SB 265 (Valladares) would make looting where the underlying crime is second-degree burglary a straight felony. The hearing on SB 265 was canceled at the request of the author.

8) **Prior Legislation:**

- a) AB 1899 (Mathis), Chapter 954, Statutes of 2022, prohibited the false impersonation of peace officers, firefighters, and other public officers and employees through, or on, an Internet website, or by other electronic means.
- b) AB 1598 (Fong), of the 2019-2020 Legislative Session, would have created a new misdemeanor for knowingly and credibly impersonating another person by electronic means for the purpose of initiating a sexual relationship with another person. AB 1598

was not heard in this committee at the request of the author.

- c) AB 1920 (Grayson), Chapter 252, Statutes of 2018, made it a misdemeanor for a person to intentionally and fraudulently impersonate a member of a search and rescue team.
- d) AB 3078 (Gallagher), Chapter 132, Statutes of 2018, expanded the crime of looting to include theft which occurs while an area is under an evacuation order.
- e) AB 2820 (Chiu), Chapter 671, Statutes of 2016, revised the definition of state of emergency and local emergency for purposes of criminal price gouging.
- f) SB 702 (Anderson), Chapter 514, Statutes of 2014, increased the maximum misdemeanor fine for a person using a badge or emblem to impersonate a peace officer, from \$1,000 to \$2,000, and requires the local law enforcement agency that files charges to seize the item used to carry out the impersonation.
- g) SB 1411 (Simitian), Chapter 335, Statutes of 2010, made it misdemeanor for a person knowingly and without consent to credibly impersonate another actual person on the Internet, or via other electronic means in order to harm, intimidate, threaten, or defraud another person.
- h) AB 1448 (Niello), Chapter 241, Statutes of 2007, requires law enforcement uniform vendors to verify that a person buying a uniform is an employee of the law enforcement agency identified on the uniform, and makes it a misdemeanor to fail to verify identity.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Brea Police Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Association of Highway Patrolmen
California Association of School Police Chiefs
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California District Attorneys Association
California Fire Chiefs Association
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
City of Arcadia
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Fire Districts Association of California
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
League of California Cities
Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC)
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
Santa Ana Police Officers Association

Oppose

ACLU California Action
All of US or None Los Angeles
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Public Defenders Association
California Public Defenders Association (CPDA)
Californians United for a Responsible Budget
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA)
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Essie Justice Group
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Initiate Justice
Initiate Justice Action
Justice2jobs Coalition
Ktown for All
LA Defensa
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
Local 148 LA County Public Defenders Union
National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON)
Public Counsel
San Francisco Public Defender
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network (SIREN)
Smart Justice California, a Project of Tides Advocacy
Universidad Popular
Vera Institute of Justice

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